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Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related and
Does It Really Matter?
Abstract

The relationship between foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy underlies the question of
whether sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate. In this article, I examine this relationship using
data on U.S. foreign exchange interventions from 1985 to 1990, recently made publicly available. I examine
whether interventions could be viewed as "signaling" changes in future monetary policy variables. I also
consider whether changes in monetary policy may induce interventions in an effort by central bankers to "
lean against the wind" of exchange rate movements. Interestingly, I find evidence both that interventions help
predict monetary policy variables and that monetary variables help predict interventions.
Disciplines

Economics | Finance | Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/226

Karen K. Lewis
University of Pennsylvania

Are Foreign Exchange
Intervention and Monetary
Policy Related, and Does It

Really Matter?*

The relationship between foreign exchange
intervention and monehas been the focus of a great deal of attention in
tary policy underlies
both academic and policy-making circles. Centhe question of whether
tral to this debate has been the observation that
sterilized interventions
can affect the exchange
sterilized interventions do not alter the relative
rate. In this article, I
money supplies of countries and therefore should
examine this relationnot have any obvious effect on the exchange
ship using data on U.S.
rate. In the 1970s and early 1980s, it was thought
foreign exchange interthat these interventions might affect the exventions from 1985 to
1990, recently made
change rate through a "portfolio balance" chanpublicly available. I exnel. Subsequent empirical research has found
amine whether interthis story to be highly implausible, however.' ventions could be
An alternative possibility, suggested by Mussa
viewed as "signaling"
(1981), is that intervention may signal changes in
changes in future monetary policy variables. I
future monetary policy. This explanation would
also consider whether
say that central banks may signal a more contracchanges in monetary
tionary future monetary policy by buying domespolicy may induce intertic currency in the foreign exchange market toventions in an effort by
day. Therefore, the expectations of future tighter
central bankers to
"lean against the
wind" of exchange rate
* I am grateful to Hans Genberg and an anonymous referee
movements. Interestfor comments, to Hyungdo Ahn for research assistance, and
ingly, I find evidence
to Ralph Smith for the intervention data as well as useful
both that interventions
conversations about the conduct of intervention policy. Any
help predict monetary
errors are mine alone.
policy variables and
1. For example, Rogoff (1984), Lewis (1988), and others
that monetary variables
as surveyed in Edison (1992) find no evidence of a portfolio
balance channel. However, Dominguez and Frankel (1993)
help predict intervenfind some support for this channel under the assumptions that
tions.

Over the last 2 decades, the question of how ster-

ilized interventions can affect the exchange rate

an international capital asset pricing model holds and that
exchange rate expectations can be measured with survey

data.

(Journal of Business, 1995, vol. 68, no. 2)
? 1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/95/6802-0002$01 .50
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monetary policy will make the exchange rate appreciate, even though
the monetary effects of the intervention are currently offset. Since this

signaling story was first proposed, a number of academic studies have
emphasized it, and Federal Reserve publications have even claimed
signaling to be a reason for and against intervening.2
If intervention provides a signal of future monetary policy, then the
intervention should indeed be followed by changes in monetary policy
variables. Therefore, in this article, I ask whether interventions help
predict changes in monetary policy by examining the relationship between intervention and monetary policy variables.3 Despite the obvious importance of this issue, its direct analysis has only recently been

made possible by the release of actual intervention data to the public.
In Section I, I begin with an illustrative example of how intervention
can affect the exchange rate through changing expectations of future

monetary policy. I then test this relationship with Granger-causality
tests of intervention on various U.S. monetary policy variables. These
monetary policy variables include MI, monetary base, nonborrowed
reserves, and the Federal Reserve (Fed) funds rate, as well as the
differential between the Fed funds rate relative to some foreign interest
rates. For many cases, there is a significant relationship between intervention and changes in monetary aggregates. However, innovations to

intervention are generally correlated with changes in monetary aggregates only within a short 2-week period. Furthermore, the coefficients
relating intervention to future monetary policy are often the wrong
sign to be consistent with the signaling story.
I therefore ask in Section II whether intervention is instead a re-

sponse to economic conditions as reflected in the monetary variables.
In this case, all of the variables except monetary base appear to explain
intervention. These basic results continue to hold when intervention
is treated as a limited dependent variable. Again, however, these rela-

tionships are strongest within a 2-week period.

One reason why intervention and monetary policy may be correlated
during the 2-week period is the way in which sterilized intervention
takes place. Section III describes how the nature of the Federal Re-

serve operating procedures together with foreign exchange interven-

2. For empirical studies discussing signaling, see Dominguez (1987) as well as other
references in Edison (1992). Signaling has been used as a reason against intervention at
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings (e.g., the minutes of FOMC meeting, August 22, 1989, in Federal Reserve Board 1989).
3. While I use actual intervention data, Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) use market observations of days when central banks were intervening to test whether market participants
would have considered intervention to be a signal. We used these observations to estimate a regime-switching process for money supply. In a similar vein, Klein and Rosengren (1991, 1992) examine the relationship between market observations of intervention
and discount rate changes by the Group of Three countries.
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tion can induce a lag between intervention and sterilization, particularly during 2-week intervals corresponding to required reserves

accounting periods. When the Granger-causality tests are performed

after lagging intervention by 1-2 weeks, there is no longer much evidence that intervention helps predict monetary aggregates.
In Section IV, I consider whether a correlation between intervention

and monetary policy would help explain the exchange rate anyway.
That is, the signaling story presumes that changes in the money supply

in fact affect the exchange rate, while empirical studies have found
little evidence that money supply changes are statistically related to
the exchange rate.4
These findings mirror early empirical findings that money supply
innovations induce a positive or insignificant effect on the interest

rate.5 These findings have recently been criticized on the grounds that

broad monetary aggregates typically used by the early studies contain
a significant component that is not under the control of the Federal
Reserve. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a, 1992b) argue that
nonborrowed reserves provide a better measure of money supply inno-

vations. By contrast, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) propose the Federal

funds rates as a monetary policy indicator and find that this measure
is a better predictor of real economic activity than any monetary aggregate.

This debate suggests a reexamination of the monetary policy shock
and exchange rate relationship as well. Broader monetary aggregates
may include money demand shocks that are inappropriate for evaluating the effects of money supply innovations on the exchange rate.
Therefore, in this article, I ask whether nonborrowed reserves or Fed
funds rates provide different implications than MI for this relationship.
I address this question by estimating the impulse response functions
of the deutsche mark (DM)/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rates
arising from these monetary shocks. Interestingly, I find that the monetary variables affect the exchange rates in the expected direction.
These results provide new evidence as well as new questions about
the relationship between exchange rates, monetary variables, and intervention. I conclude by noting the limitations of these results and
pointing to some important directions for future research.
I. Does Intervention Help "Signal" Future Monetary Variables?

The "signaling hypothesis" states that interventions induce traders in
the market to alter their expectations of future monetary policy. This
4. See, e.g., Meese and Rogoff (1983). In contrast, Mark (1993) finds a significant
relationship between money supplies and exchange rates over long horizons.
5. See, e.g., Mishkin (1981, 1982) and the references in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1991).
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hypothesis requires that interventions are in fact related to monetary
variables in a systematic way. In this section, I first provide a simple
example to illustrate what people may mean when they talk about
this hypothesis. I then present evidence on the relationship between
intervention and monetary policy.
A. A Simple Example of the Signaling Hypothesis

Consider a standard asset-pricing model
00

S= (1 - 0) ZOiEtft+j, (1)
J=o

where s is the log exchange rate, f is the log of "fundamentals," and

0 is a discount factor. In monetary models of the exchange rate, 0 =

I/(l + (x), where ax is the semielasticity of money demand.6 More
specifically, let ft be given by

t = (mt,- m,* + v, (2)
where m and m * are the domestic and foreign monetary policy variables and v measures other fundamentals out of the control of the

monetary authorities.
For simplicity, I will assume that m* and v are exogenous and are

mutually uncorrelated. In this case, it can be shown that the exchange
rate solution is composed of two components. The first component
depends on the expectations of future domestic money, m. The second
component depends on current expectations of future values of m*
and v.7 To focus on the role of monetary shocks, I will subsume the

effects of v and m* by setting their values equal to zero so that ft =
mt. This assumption implies that the effects of future expectations
about these variables will be ignored. However, setting these variables

equal to zero does not lose generality for studying the effects of inter-

vention and domestic money on exchange rates since future expectations of v and m* are by assumption independent of m and n.
To correspond roughly with the empirical analysis above, I will treat

the process of fundamentals as autoregressive in first differences:

Amt = Pmtim_1 + Pnot-k + Ut, (3)
where A is the backward difference operator, Pm is the autoregressive

coefficient of fundamentals differences on their own lag, nt is foreign
exchange intervention at time t, and i is a parameter relating intervention k periods in the past with a current change in money supply. The
variable n is measured as purchases of domestic currency (sales of
6. See, e.g., Frenkel and Mussa (1980) and Mussa (1982).
7. See the discussion in Lewis (1989).

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:42:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Foreign

Exchange

189

foreign currency) by the central bank. If the central bank is "signaling"
with interventions that are consistent with subsequent changes in
money supplies, then an increase in n at t - k will be correlated with

a decrease in m in the future at time t. Therefore, a would be negative.
Calculating the expectations in the exchange rate equation (1) requires a process for intervention. In keeping with the autoregressive

structure above, this process is assumed to follow:8
nt=

where

Pnnt-i

E(etud)

=

+

et,

(4)

0.

For a general lag k at which intervention signals monetary policy,

the exchange rate solution can be represented as
00

St = mt-, + 5m(A~mt - P nt-k) + Pam , OiEtntk+j, (5)
1=0

where 5m (1 - PM) - The exchange rate depends on three components: the lagged money supply level, the discounted present value of

the change in the money supply adjusted for the effects of lagged
intervention, and the expected discounted present value of all future
interventions. In particular, the current change in the money supply
less intervention effects is discounted by 5m' giving the present value
of the effects of the current monetary policy change on all future periods. The effects of all future intervention on the exchange rate is
also discounted by the monetary effects on all future periods as mea-

sured by Ems
As equation (5) shows, current interventions affect the exchange
rate according to how they alter the expectations of future money
supplies and thereby the exchange rate. This effect depends upon the

parameter I. Note that when P equals zero, then according to equation

(3), intervention conveys no information about future money supply
changes. In this case, the last term in equation (5) shows that intervention has no effect on the exchange rate. In contrast, when expected
dollar purchases as measured by increases in n signal future reductions
in monetary policy, then P is negative. In this case, current and expected future dollar purchases will lead to dollar appreciation today.
To consider a more concrete example, suppose that the lag between
interventions of dollar purchases and changes in the money supply is
1 period, so that k = 1. In this case, the exchange rate solution is

St = mt1 + bmAmt + I30m Bn t, (5')
8. This process treats intervention as a continuous process for simplicity. As will be
seen below, there are many days in the data when no intervention occurs, however.
Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) treat the occurrence of intervention as affecting the future
money supply relative to its level in the absence of intervention.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:42:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

190

Journal

where

of

Business

5m-

(1

-

Opn

the exchange rate in the direction implied by the signaling story as

long as P < 0. In this case, an increase in current dollar purchases will

increase the expected money supplies next period and thereby the

exchange rate through the discount rate of money on the exchange
rate, 0. The present value of this effect on all future expected interven-

tion levels, and therefore money supplies, is measured by the product

of the discount factors of money, 5m' and of intervention, An.
If the lag between intervention and money supply changes, k, is
longer than 1 period, then the example becomes more complicated but
these basic features remain. The longer is k, the farther in the future
current interventions are expected to affect the money supply and,
therefore, the less impact interventions will have on the exchange rate
today.

B. Interventions and Monetary Policy Measures
I now examine whether intervention helps predict future changes in

monetary policy. The intervention series are daily interventions by the
Federal Reserve from 1985 to 1990. The U.S. monetary policy variables studied are MI, monetary base, nonborrowed reserves, and the
Fed funds rate. These data are available at different frequencies. The
shortest frequency of the Fed funds rate is daily, and that of MI is
weekly, but monetary base and nonborrowed reserves are available

only biweekly. The Data Appendix (App. A) gives the sources of these
variables.

Figure 1 shows some of these measures of monetary policy during
the period of study. The top panel plots weekly observations of MI

money supply together with the Fed funds rate. As the picture shows,
the growth rate of MI accelerated during 1985 and 1986. At the same
time, the Fed funds rate trended downward, in tandem with other
interest rates. From mid-1984 to the end of 1986, most interest rates
declined 5-6 percentage points. These downward movements were
accommodated by two discount rate cuts in April and August 1986.
Monetary policy was quite different during the period from 1987
through late 1988. Largely in response to an increase in inflation, the
Federal Reserve began tightening reserves in the second quarter of
1987, and as a result most of the monetary aggregates rose at much
smaller rates. The top panel of figure 1 shows the sharp deceleration
in the growth rate of MI as well as the upward trend in the Fed funds
rate extending into 1988. This tightening of monetary policy was accentuated with discount rate increases in October 1987, August 1988, and
February 1989.
Recent empirical studies have emphasized that movements in broad
monetary aggregates such as MI can be misleading measures of mone-
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FIG. I.-Relationship between monetary variables. A, weekly series. MI
dotted line; Fed funds = solid line. B. biweekly series. MI = dotted line; Fed
funds = solid line; Nonborrowed reserves = dashed line. Note.-Ml is in
$10 million units. Nonborrowed reserves are in $1 million units.

tary policy, relative to nonborrowed reserves. Panel B of figure I depicts nonborrowed reserves against MI and Fed funds, observed only
biweekly.
C. Are Interventions Related to U.S. Monetary Policy Variables?
To test whether intervention helps predict these monetary policy vari-

ables, bivariate vector autoregressions (VARs) were estimated for
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each monetary variable and intervention. In other words, equations
were estimated for the systems

[AM(i)t, nt]' = B(L)[AM(i)t, nt]' + Et, (6)
and

E(EtE') = V,
where M(i) is the monetary aggregate for i = MI, monetary base
(MB), nonborrowed reserves (NBR), or Fed funds (FF); where B(L)

is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator, L; and where t is a bivariat

independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable with

mean vector zero.9
In order to combine intervention and monetary aggregates at differ-

ent frequencies, several intervention series were formed. First, since

MI is measured from Monday to Monday, the daily intervention series
were cumulated over the same period. These data together with Monday Fed funds rates were used as the weekly frequency data series.
Second, since monetary base and nonborrowed reserves are measured
Wednesday to the second following Wednesday, a second intervention
series was cumulated over the same period. These data were used as

the biweekly frequency data series."
The maximum lag length of these VARs was first tested with a Wald

test of zero restrictions at each lag. As reported in Appendix table B 1
these lag lengths were quite short. Except for the monetary base, the
maximum lag length of these VARs were 2 weeks or less.
Panel A of table 1 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of
intervention on the monetary policy variables.11 Interestingly, the hypothesis that intervention does not help predict monetary policy at the
biweekly frequency is rejected at the 90% confidence level for three of
the four monetary measures. Furthermore, intervention is significantly
related to the Fed funds rate at the weekly frequency.
For the signaling story to be right, the coefficient on lagged intervention should indicate that dollar purchases are correlated with contractionary monetary policy. When monetary policy is measured by monetary aggregates, the coefficient on lagged intervention should be
negative. When this policy is measured by Fed funds, dollar purchases
should raise the interest rate, so that the lagged intervention coefficient
should be positive.
9. Note that first-differencing the monetary aggregates in the VAR imposes the condition that intervention is a stationary variable.

10. MI and Fed funds were also used with this series. Experimentation with cumulating intervention with MI from Monday to the second Monday and using Wednesday
Fed funds rates did not alter the basic conclusions below.
11. It should be noted that, while I use the standard terminology of "causality," the
usual caveat applies here that correlation does not imply causality.
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TABLE 1 Granger-Causality Tests of Intervention on U.S. Monetary Variables
and VAR Coefficients
A. Granger-Causality Tests

Predicted Variables
Frequency

Daily

AMI

.

.

Weekly
Biweekly

AMB

.

.

.

.306
.093

ANBR

.

...

.059

..

AFF

.318

...

.006

.843

.053

B. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Daily Frequency
Lags
Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

AFF -.02 -.11 .07 .01 .07 .08 -.09 -.02 .05
(.07) (.11) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.05)
C. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Weekly Frequency
Lags
Variable

1

2

AMI
AFF

.305
...
(.298)
-.002*
.007*
(<.001) (<.001)

D. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Biweekly Frequency
Lags
Variable

1

2

AMI

.719
(.428)
AMB
.354
1.094*
(.633)
(.512)
ANBR
.015
(.077)
AFF
.004*
...
(<.001)
NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients
of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and intervention. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10
lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9 ....
The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was
corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987). These tests are reported

in Appendix table Bi. Panels B-D report coefficient estimates of VARs. The column variables are
the first difference of monetary variables: MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves,
FF = Fed funds rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 95% confidence level.
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Panels B, C, and D of table 1 report at the daily, weekly, and biweekly frequencies, respectively, the coefficient estimates on lagged
intervention for each of the measures of monetary policy. Panel B
shows that daily intervention has no discernible relationship with
changes in the Fed funds rate. Panel C demonstrates that the coeffi-

cient on lagged intervention for MI and Fed funds is the opposite sign
from the signaling story for a 1-week lag, although not for Fed funds

at a 2-week lag. Panel D reports the coefficients at the biweekly frequency. For MI and monetary base, the coefficients are again of the
wrong sign at the first lag. However, the coefficient for monetary base
at two lags is significantly of the sign predicted by the signaling story.
The correlation between lagged intervention and Fed funds is again

significant and, combining the effects of the first- and second-week
lags, it is also positive.

Overall, the evidence in table 1 provides a mixed picture of the
signaling story. Lagged intervention is significantly related to future
changes in weekly and biweekly Fed funds rates and biweekly MI and
monetary base. However, the correlations are in the direction suggested by the signaling story only over biweekly Fed funds changes
and monetary base changes.
D. Are Interventions Related to Future Relative

Monetary Policies?
The theoretical example above illustrated that U.S. monetary policy
relative to foreign monetary policy is the important variable for de-

termining the exchange rate. Therefore, it may seem inappropriate to
focus on U.S. monetary variables alone. Unfortunately, foreign money
supply data are typically available only at a monthly frequency. Since
the data sample is short, I cannot use monthly money supply data with
much confidence.
As an alternative I considered the interest differentials between the
United States and two countries, Germany and Japan. The German

and Japanese call money rates were used to correspond to an overnight
interbank rate, as is the Fed funds rate. These variables were then
used instead of the U.S. monetary policy variables above to, first,
test the lag lengths and then to conduct Granger-causality tests. The
lag-length tests are reported in Appendix table B2. As with the U.S.

monetary policy variables, the lag lengths are quite short. Except for
the differential between the Fed funds rate and the German rate, the

lag lengths were all 2 weeks more or less.12
Panel A of table 2 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of
12. The Fed funds/German rate appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the day of the
week that the variables were sampled. When the series were sampled on Wednesdays
instead of Mondays, the lag length was 1 week. The longer lag structure is used in the
estimation results below in order to provide more conservative estimates.
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intervention on these interest differentials. However, the hypothesis

that intervention provides no information concerning future interest
differentials cannot be rejected in any case.
Panals B and C report the coefficients on lagged intervention in these
VARs to see if they indicate any pattern between lagged intervention

and future monetary policy. However, the signs are mixed, and most
of the coefficient estimates are insignificantly different from zero.
II. Do Monetary Variables Help "Signal" Intervention?

An alternative view of the correlation between intervention and mone-

tary policy is that central banks intervene to try to maintain a monetary
policy that is consistent with their targets of the exchange rate. In this
case, changes in monetary policy with domestic targets in mind may

induce counterproductive movements in the exchange rate. These
movements in the exchange rate may, in turn, induce central bankers

to intervene in order to try to "lean against the wind."
Indeed, this type of behavior seemed to characterize Federal Re-

serve policy for periods during 1988-90. In particular, while monetary
policy remained relatively contractionary well into 1989, as noted
above, the Federal Reserve intervened heavily to sell dollars for most
of the period. Starting on June 27, 1988, the Federal Reserve sold
dollars in the foreign exchange market, totalling $5 billion by September 26. A second round of heavy dollar selling began on January 6,
1989, despite the fact that monetary policy remained relatively tight.
The conflict between the objectives to fight inflation by the Fed

and to keep the dollar from strengthening, deemed desirable by the
Treasury, became evident in meetings of the Federal Open Market

Committee. During early 1989, debate increased among the governors
on the Federal Reserve board concerning intervention carried out at

the behest of the Treasury and the appropriateness of its signal toward
monetary policy. By the FOMC meeting on May 16, 1989, intervention
had become an important item of discussion as large purchases of
foreign currency assets by the New York Federal Reserve Bank had
increased its holdings beyond the legal limit. By the August 22 FOMC
meeting, many governors were critical of the intervention policy. Gov-

ernors Angell and Johnson dissented on a move that would allow fur-

ther intervention stating "intervention confuses market participants
concerning the policy commitment toward price stability" (minutes of
FOMC meeting, August 22, 1989, in Federal Reserve Board 1989).
A. Is There a Relationship between Monetary Policy and
Future Interventions?

As this discussion suggests, intervention and monetary policy may be
related by a "leaning against the wind" policy in which monetary
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TABLE 2 Granger-Causality Tests of Intervention on Interest Differentials and
VAR Coefficients

A. Granger-Causality Tests

Predicted Variables

Frequency

FF

-

Rjpn

FF

-

RGer

Daily
.472
.283
Weekly
.120
.581
B. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Daily Frequency

Predicted Variables

Lag
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

FF

-Rjpn

FF

-

RGer

.066

.073
(.053)
(.051)
-.058
-.031
(.073)
(.070)
-.124
-.118
(.105)
(.105)
.054
.059
(.054)
(.054)
.012
.000
(.044)
(.047)
.082*
.079
(.048)
(.046)
.053
.055
(.053)
(.051)
-.077
-.073
(.067)
(.064)
.000
.000
(.056)
(.056)
C. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Weekly Frequency
Predicted Variables

Lag
1
2

FF

-Rjpn

FF

-

RGer

-.091
-.047
(.048)
(.042)
.025
.038

3

...

(.053)
(.061)
.026

(.0
NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients
of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and intervention. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10
lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9, ....
The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was
corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987). These tests are reported
in Appendix table B2. Panels B and C report coefficient estimates of VARs. The column variables

are FF = Fed funds rate, Rjpn is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money
rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.

* Significant at the 90% level.
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policy helps predict future changes in intervention. To evaluate this
possibility, table 3 reports marginal significance levels from Granger-

causality tests of intervention on the monetary aggregates in each column. Interventions appear to be predictable at the biweekly frequency
both from Fed funds rate changes and from nonborrowed reserves

changes, although this relationship is less apparent from the broader
monetary aggregates. In contrast, Fed funds rate changes at the higher
frequencies of weekly and daily appear to contain no information about
intervention changes.

As reported in table 4, this pattern is reversed when Granger-

causality tests of Fed funds differentials with foreign rates are used
instead. In this case, weekly changes in interest differentials of the
Fed funds against the Japanese and German call money rates provide
no information about interventions. However, daily movements in

these differentials appear to predict intervention movements, particularly for the Japanese case.
Overall, movements in Fed funds and nonborrowed reserves appear

TABLE 3 Granger-Causality Tests of U.S. Monetary Variables on Intervention
"Causal" Variables

Frequency

Daily

.

AMI

..

.

AMB

..

.

ANBR

..

.

AFF

113

Weekly
.093
...
...
.615
Biweekly .090 .635 .020 .027
NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all coefficients on
lags of the column variable equal zero in a projection of intervention on lagged intervention and lags
of the column variable. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with
a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero,
for k = 10, 9, .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The
covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987).
These tests are reported in Appendix table B1. The column variables are the first difference of
monetary variables: MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed funds rate.

TABLE 4 Granger-Causality Tests of Interest Differentials on Intervention

"Causal" Variables

Frequency FF - R1Pn FF - RGer
Daily
.016
.077
Weekly
.283
.615
NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all coefficients on
lags of the column variable equal zero in a projection of intervention on lagged intervention and lags

of the column variable. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with
a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero,

for k = 10, 9, .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The
covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987).

These tests are reported in Appendix table B2. The column variables are FF = Fed funds rate, Rlpn
is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.
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to be useful for predicting intervention at longer horizons of 2 weeks,
while interest differentials are useful for predicting intervention at intervals less than a week.
B. Treating Intervention as a Limited Dependent Variable
The analysis above treated intervention as a continuous random variable since it can take any value on the real line. However, there were

many days in which no intervention occurred, so that much of the
distribution of intervention observations is concentrated at zero. The
errors from regressions of intervention on other variables may therefore be far from normally distributed in small samples. For this reason,
I also treat intervention as a limited dependent variable that is a function of lagged monetary policy variables.
Intervention was classified into three cases defined as follows:

It = 0 no intervention,
It = -1 dollar sales,

Ir= 1 dollar purchases.
Using this measure of intervention, the probability of intervention was

treated as a logistic probability function given by

prob(It = 0) =
_k

exp go + E geAM(i)t-e (7a)
[

k

1

+

__1

ex

(=1

prob(It= -1)=
_k

exp co + E ce AM(i)t-e (7b)
e=1

1 + exp[go + E geAM(i)t-e] + exp[co + kCeM(i),e
__1

(=1

and

prob(It = 1)=

1 + exp [go + EgeM(i)te 1+ exp [co + c1AM(i),_
__1

(

=1
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where M(i) is the monetary variable; i = MI, MB, NBR, FF, as
before; and k is the maximum lag in the vector autoregression estimated above for each bivariate system.
The intuition behind these equations can be seen more readily by
taking the logarithms of these probabilities, forming the odds ratios,
and focusing on the case where k = 1:

log[prob(I = -1)/prob(I, = 1)] = co + cliAM(i), 1, (8a)

log[prob(I, = O)/prob(I, = 1)] = go + gjAM(i),_1, (8b)
and

log[prob(I, = - l)Iprob(I, = 0)] = (co - go) + (c] - g1) AM(i)M I. (8c)
Now suppose that large increases in monetary variables induce a depreciation in the currency and, thus, a dollar purchase intervention in
response. If the Fed is "leaning against the wind," an increase in
AM(i), for i = MI, MB, and NBR will increase the probability of a

dollar purchase intervention (I, = 1) relative to a dollar sale intervention (I, = - 1), so that we would expect cl < 0. Similarly, the increase

in M(i) should increase the probability of a dollar purchase intervention

relative to no intervention in (8b), so that g, < 0. Finally, the increase

in M(i) may decrease the probability of a dollar sale intervention in

(8c) relative to no intervention, so that cl - g, < 0. For the Fed funds

rate as the dependent variable, a similar relationship applies, but with
the opposite sign.

The constant coefficients in (8) have a similarly intuitive interpreta-

tion. If there is no change in the money supply, so that AM(i) = 0,
then the probabilities are simply

prob(I,= 0) = exp(go)/[l + exp(go) + exp(co)], (9a)
prob(I = - 1) = exp(co)I[1 + exp(go) + exp(co)], (9b)
and

prob(I,= 1) = exp(O)/[l + exp(go) + exp(co)] (9c)
= 1/[I + exp(go) + exp(co)].

Thus, the relationship between go, co, and zero indicates the probabilities of each intervention type when the monetary aggregate does not
change.

Table 5 reports the results of estimating the logistic probabilities for
each monetary aggregate examined in tables 1 and 3. As column 1
shows, movements in Ml are significant explanatory variables for the
probability of intervention. Interestingly, both cl and g, are negative,
as predicted by the "leaning against the wind" explanation. However,

cl - 91 > 0, so that the increase in M(i) increases the probability of

a dollar sale intervention relative to no intervention.
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TABLE 5 Logistic Probability Estimates of Intervention
k

log[prob(It = - 1)/prob(It = 1)] = co + E cfAM(i),_ f
f=1
k

log[prob(It = - 1)/prob(It = 0)] = go + E geAM(i)t_ e
f=,

AM(i) Co go cl g1 C2 g2 % Predicted
Ml .734* 1.320* - .122** - .152** ... ... 52.3
(.206) (.192) (.073) (.068)
MB .959* 1.429* - .249** - .236* - .175 - .187 50.0
(.334) (.319) (.127) (.120) (.129) (.122)
NBR

.559*

1.138*

.188

.283

..

.

.

53.5

(.247) (.226) (.382) (.351)
FF .456* 1.534* .073 - .012 .130 .032 64.3
(.208) (.179) (.179) (.160) (.191) (.153)
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. The frequencies of the estimates are Ml, weekly;
MB, biweekly; NBR, biweekly; and FF, weekly.
* Significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
** Significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.

The first lag of monetary base also suggests "leaning against the

wind" behavior. Both cl and g, are significantly negative. Furthermore, in this case, cl - g, is also negative, consistent with the view

that increases in the monetary base reduce the probability of dollar
sales interventions relative to no intervention. However, the second
lags do not appear to affect significantly the likelihood of intervention.
Despite the significant effects of MI and monetary base, neither
nonborrowed reserves nor Fed funds appear to affect the probability
of intervention. This pattern reverses the finding in table 3, where MI
and monetary base did not predict the intervention variable, while Fed
funds and nonborrowed reserves did. A reason may be that the logit
estimation focuses on whether intervention occurs, while the Grangercausality tests in table 3 analyze the magnitudes of intervention. Variations in the endogenous components in MI and monetary base may
affect the decision to intervene, while movements in the monetary
policy variables such as nonborrowed reserves and Fed funds may
influence the magnitudes of intervention.
III. Is the Operating System Responsible?

A feature of the relationship between intervention and monetary aggregates found above is that the maximum lags in the vector autoregressions are typically 2 weeks. Of course, while an autoregressive process

implies that shocks today persist indefinitely, moving average processes with innovations that disappear at fixed lags can look much like
autoregressive processes. Thus, the relationships found above suggest
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a possible alternative explanation for the apparent correlation between
monetary variables and intervention.
To understand this explanation, it is necessary to examine the op-

erating system of the Federal Reserve together with intervention operations. The domestic monetary policy is based on a borrowed reserves
targeting procedure. Under this procedure, the FOMC selects a level

of borrowed reserves to be used as an operating target, based on an
assumed relationship between the Fed funds rate and borrowed re-

serves. On a day-to-day basis, open market operations are primarily
guided by an interim target for nonborrowed reserves based on an
estimated demand for total reserves (subtracting out the borrowed re-

serves component). The nonborrowed reserves target is changed on a
daily basis as revised estimates of required reserves are received and,

less frequently, as excess reserve estimates are reviewed."3
Foreign exchange intervention affects the supply of nonborrowed
reserves when the Federal Reserve receives payment by debiting the

reserve account of a purchasers' depository institution. However, this

intervention does not affect nonborrowed reserves targets. 14 Depending on the elasticity of short-term reserves demand, the institution
of the purchaser of foreign exchange can either allow its dollar reserve
level to fall temporarily or else try to increase the reserve level to its
former level. If the banking system as a whole is willing to allow
reserves to fall in the short run, then the intervention may not be
effectively sterilized immediately. However, given the biweekly accounting for required reserves, the demand for reserves will likely
return to its previous level over the 2-week period.
As a result of this complicated interaction of shocks to reserve supply induced by foreign exchange intervention and short-run demand for
reserves, the effects of intervention on reserves may not be completely

sterilized immediately. Rather, sterilization may occur only over time
as the demand for reserves returns to its previous level.
If this story holds true, then the relationship between monetary ag-

gregates and intervention during 2-week intervals may reflect in part

the evolution of reserve demand. In this case, the correlations between

monetary aggregates and intervention may have nothing to do with
intentional signaling by the Federal Reserve.
As a simple check on this possibility, the vector autoregressions in
tables 1 and 3 were repeated, after lagging intervention by 1 period. If
13. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the operating procedure changed
during the sample period. Since late 1987, the Federal Reserve trading desk has adopted
a more flexible approach to pursuing the borrowing objective, due to a striking instability
in the behavior of borrowed reserves during that year. See Federal Reserve Board
(1991).
14. The Open Market Operations desk uses this information to update its forecasts
of reserves on the settlement date. For most currencies, settlement takes place 2 days
from agreeing to buy or sell foreign exchange.
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TABLE 6 Granger-Causality Tests between U.S. Monetary Variables and
Intervention Lagged 1 Period

Frequency

AMI

AMB

ANBR

AFF

A. Predicted variables:
Weekly
.424
...
...
.006
Biweekly .893 .084 .708 .128
B. "Causal" variables:

Weekly
.255
...
...
.615
Biweekly .893 .707 .341 .367
NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels for the hypothesis that lagged coefficients
of intervention are zero in a projection of the column variable for panel A and for the hypothesis
that lagged coefficients of the column variable are zero in a projection of intervention for panel B.
See notes in tables 1 and 3 concerning lag lengths.

the relationships between intervention and money are due to the nature

of the operating system, then lagging intervention will increase the
likelihood that the sterilization process has been completed.
Table 6 reports these results. As the table shows in panel A, the

hypothesis that intervention does not Granger cause monetary variables cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level for any variable
except the Fed funds rate at a weekly frequency. Also, as reported in

panel B, the hypothesis that monetary variables do not Granger cause
intervention cannot be rejected for any of the monetary variables.
Although this evidence is only suggestive, it supports the notion that
the correlation between intervention and monetary aggregates may
arise from a timing lag in the sterilization process.
IV. Does It Matter Anyway?

To this point, I have examined the relationship between intervention

and monetary aggregates. The evidence indicates both that intervention helps predict changes in monetary aggregates and that monetary

aggregates help predict intervention. Once intervention is lagged 1 period to help reduce the likelihood that the sterilization of the intervention has not been completed, intervention continues to help explain
Fed funds movements. However, none of the monetary variables help
explain intervention. This evidence suggests that intervention may indeed help explain future movements in monetary policy, at least as
characterized by Fed funds movements.
I now consider a more basic question: does it matter if intervention
explains monetary indicators? In the simple example described in Section I, intervention moves the exchange rate because its relationship
with future monetary policy induces traders to revise their forecasts

of future monetary variables, and these monetary variables affect the
exchange rate. This signaling story relies on the underlying presumption that money matters for determining the exchange rate.
Although all standard theoretical models use monetary variables as
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key ingredients of exchange rate determination, empirical examination
has found little evidence of such a relationship. Thus, an important
question is, Does it really matter?
A. Does the Exchange Rate Really Depend on U.S.
Monetary Variables?
To address this question, I estimated bivariate VARs of U.S. monetary

policy variables together with the German DM/dollar rate and the Jap-

anese yen/dollar rate and examined the impulse response functions of
exchange rates to the monetary variable. Given the recent debate on
the monetary transmission mechanism, it is interesting to compare the
effects of different monetary indicators. I therefore examine the impulse response functions from three different measures of monetary
policy.

MI has been the most frequently used measure of money supply in
previous studies. For comparison with these studies, the first monetary
variable used is MI.
The second monetary variable is motivated by the recent debate

concerning the appropriate measure of monetary policy. Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992a, 1992b) argue that early studies of the relation-

ship between interest rates and money supplies were incorrect because
they used MI and other broad measures of monetary aggregates. Both
of these aggregates include borrowed reserves that are positively correlated with the Fed funds rate and other interest rates since increases

in these rates induce banks to borrow more at the discount window.
Although borrowed reserves are a very small component of MI and
monetary base, they display considerable variability. As a result, MI
is frequently found to be positively correlated with interest rates, while

subtracting out borrowed reserves gives a negative relationship with
interest rates. Christiano and Eichenbaum find that when nonborrowed

reserves are used as monetary measures instead of MI or monetary

base, then innovations to nonborrowed reserves imply negative responses of interest rates, as a liquidity channel would suggest.
If MI contains a significant component that varies positively with
interest rates, then this variable may also be inappropriate for studies

based on a monetary model of the exchange rate that depends on a

liquidity effect."5 Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether nonborrowed reserves innovations will provide stronger evidence of a monetary channel than MI. For this reason, the second monetary aggregate
I use is nonborrowed reserves.

The third monetary indicator examined is the Fed funds rate. Ber15. For example, the model in Mussa (1982) is based on money demand equations
such that shocks to money supply should imply a negative relationship with interest
rates, consistent with the liquidity effect. If Ml shocks contain mostly money demand
shocks, then shocks to Ml should be associated with an appreciation of the domestic
currency.
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nanke and Blinder (1992) find that this rate is a stronger predictor of
real economic activity than monetary variables. They argue that the
Fed funds rate is relatively exogenous in the short run as a result
of Federal Reserve targeting and is the appropriate monetary policy
indicator. 16
B. Empirical Implementation
To examine the effects of each of these three monetary variables, I
estimated bivariate VARs of the logarithm of their levels together with
the logarithm of the levels of the exchange rates. In order to compare
the effects on exchange rates with studies of effects on interest rates,
I follow the practice in the literature of estimating these VARs in levels
to allow for possible cointegration among the variables and treat the

monetary indicator as the first component in the vector. I also follow
a procedure similar to the lag-length tests above to determine the lag
length. Given a maximum lag length of 10 biweekly periods, I calcu-

late the Wald test of zero coefficients for all lags greater than or equal

to successively shorter lags until the hypothesis is rejected at the 95%
confidence level. As before, the variance-covariance matrix allows for
conditional heteroscedasticity, an important consideration in these
systems since exchange rates are well-known to be heteroscedastic.
The lag lengths and their marginal significance levels are reported in
Appendix table B3.

Given these lag lengths, the VARs were estimated similarly to equation (6) above:

[m(i),, st]' = B(L)[m(i),, st]' + et, (10)
and

E(ete') = I,
where now m(i) is the logarithm of the monetary indicator; i = MI,

NBR, FF; and s is the logarithm of the exchange rate for either the
DM/dollar rate or the yen/dollar rate.'7 From the estimates of these
VARs, the impulse response functions were calculated.
In order to evaluate the significance of the responses in exchange
rates, Monte Carlo experiments were performed to generate the empirical distribution of the impulse response functions. The Monte Carlo
experiments were implemented as follows. First, the VAR in (10)
above was estimated and the parameter estimates, B(L), and the fitted
16. They also argue that the monetary transmission mechanism works because reductions in reserves by the Federal Reserve reduces the amount of loans made to customers
and, therefore, aggregated demand falls. For more on the argument, see Bernanke and
Blinder (1992).

17. The logarithm of the Fed funds rate was used to correspond to its treatment in
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b). The essential results below are unchanged when
using the level of the Fed funds rate.
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et,

were

A, was formed. The Cholesky decomposition of E was then calculated,
and its lower triangular matrix form, G, was saved.
Then, these next steps were followed repeatedly. (i) Generate a two-

dimensional random variable, vp, the length of the number of observations. (ii) Premultiply by G to obtain G'vt = et. (iii) Add these values
for et to the right-hand side of (10), and generate the left-hand-side
variables, [m(i)t, st]'. (iv) Estimate the vector autoregression in (10)
and save the parameter estimates, B(L). (v) Using B(L), form the moving average representation of the vector autoregression, and generate
the impulse response functions. (vi) Save the impulse responses and

repeat 300 times."8 From these observations, the 95% bounds on the
empirical distribution were obtained.

Figure 2 shows the estimates of the impulse response functions together with the 95% confidence intervals for the DM/dollar rate. The
top panel shows the effect of a 1% shock in MI. As would be predicted
by a monetary model, the value of the dollar declines immediately and
stays lower. However, the confidence intervals show that the depreciation in the dollar is significant only between 4 and 16 weeks after the
shock. Nevertheless, the significant effect of the shock of Ml on the
exchange rate is somewhat surprising given previous research on exchange rates.

The middle panel of figure 2 shows the effects when nonborrowed
reserves are used as monetary indicators. Unlike the Ml measure, the
nonborrowed reserves shock has no immediate impact on the exchange
rate. But quite interestingly, the depreciating effects on the exchange
rate become significant after 4 weeks and remain significant even after
20 weeks.

The last column shows the effects of a shock in the Fed funds rate.
Like nonborrowed reserves, there is no immediate effect on the ex-

change rate. The point estimates imply that the rise in Fed funds induces an appreciation in the dollar after 2 weeks. However, these
estimates are never statistically different from the 95% level (although

they are at the 90% level).
While these estimates would suggest that monetary measures might
explain the exchange rate as standard models predict, the response
functions for the yen/dollar rate in figure 3 give a different story. A
shock to MI induces very little variation in the yen/dollar rate, and
the confidence intervals are quite large. The point estimates of impulse
responses to nonborrowed reserves shocks and Fed funds shocks generally imply movements in the exchange rate in the direction suggested
by a monetary model with liquidity effects. But the estimates are never
significantly different from zero.
18. Experimentation with the distributions from 2,000 repetitions for several of the
VARs indicated that the results were little changed by more repetitions.
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FIG. 2.-Impulse response functions of DM/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
monetary shocks. The dashed line represents the 95% confidence interval from
the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid line represents impulse response estimates.
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FIG. 3.-Impulse response functions of yen/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
monetary shocks. The dashed line represents the 95% confidence interval from
the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid line represents impulse response estimates.
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C. Does the Exchange Rate Depend on Relative
Monetary Policies?
The focus of the previous analysis on U.S. monetary policy variables

alone is an important shortcoming. As discussed above, monetary
models would imply that exchange rates depend on relative money
supplies. While the lack of high frequency money supply data preclude

an investigation of money supply differentials over the short sample
period, interest rate data can provide some information about the
stance of foreign monetary policy.
Therefore, I estimated trivariate vector autoregressions similar to
those examined in figures 2 and 3, but including the German and Japanese call money rates. In particular, the system estimated was

[m(i),, r*, st]' = B(L)[m(i),, r*, st]' + et, (1 1)
where r* is the logarithm of the German call money rate when the
exchange rate is the DM/dollar rate and the Japanese call money rate
when the exchange rate is the yen/dollar rate. Thus, the exchange rate
was placed as last in the VAR order. These VARs were estimated, the
impulse response functions calculated, and the Monte Carlo distributions generated as above.

Figure 4 depicts the impulse response functions of the DM/dollar
rate from shocks to U.S. monetary aggregates controlling for the Ger-

man interest rates. Strikingly, the basic pattern found in figure 2 continues to emerge. A shock in MI is related to an immediate depreciation

in the dollar. This decline is now statistically significant and continues
for about 12 weeks. The nonborrowed reserves shock continues to

imply a depreciation in the dollar even at 20 weeks. And finally, the
Fed funds shock now becomes statistically significant after 6 weeks.
Figure 5 depicts these same impulse response functions for the yen/

dollar rate. As before, none of the impulse responses are significantly
different from zero at the 95% level, although at the 90% level nonborrowed reserves are significant for some periods.
Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in monetary policy affect the exchange rate in the direction implied by standard monetary
models. Except for MI, however, there is little evidence of a contemporaneous effect.

V. Concluding Remarks

This article has provided two new sets of empirical findings. First, it
examined the relationship between foreign exchange intervention and
U.S. monetary policy variables during the period from 1985 to 1990.
The evidence suggests that there were significant correlations in both
directions between the two variables. Second, the article analyzed
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FIG. 4.-Impulse response functions of DM/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
monetary shocks controlling for German interest rates. The dashed line repre-

sents the 95% confidence interval from the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid

line represents impulse response estimates.
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FIG. 5.-Impulse response functions of yen/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
monetary shocks controlling for Japanese interest rates. The dashed line repre-

sents the 95% confidence interval from the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid
line represents impulse response estimates.
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the effects on exchange rates of innovations to different measures of

monetary policy variables suggested by the recent debate on the do-

mestic monetary transmission mechanism. Interestingly, positive innovations in nonborrowed reserves appear to be more systematically
related to depreciation in the dollar exchange rates than MI. This
finding is consistent with the Christiano-Eichenbaum view that MI
contains a larger endogenous component relative to nonborrowed reserves.

Generally, this article has produced new empirical findings in the

relationship between monetary variables, foreign exchange intervention, and exchange rates. A continuing challenge for international researchers is to provide theoretical explanations for these relationships.
In addition, the evidence here leaves open several particular issues
and questions.
First, the innovations in monetary policy variables did not control

for real economic activity. The money supply decision presumably
depends on variables such as the inflation rate and income growth.
The short sample period of intervention precluded an analysis based
on real variables measured monthly or quarterly. However, an issue
for future research will be to reexamine the effect on the exchange
rate using different measures of monetary policy controlling for real
economic policy objectives.
Second, the analysis in this paper focused on the behavior of U.S.
monetary variables, while the exchange rate should depend on relative
monetary variables. Once foreign monetary variables are introduced,
the current debate concerning the monetary transmission mechanism
is doubled. The parallel question of what variables to use as foreign
monetary policy indicators arises, as does how these variables feed
into real economic behavior. These questions also raise the issue of

whether individual-country monetary transmission processes can generate international feedback effects.
Third, this article has only documented the empirical relationship
between intervention and the money supply; the reason for this correlation is not yet apparent. Although I have suggested that lags in the

sterilization process implicit in borrowed reserves targeting may be
responsible, future research should analyze more specifically the
source of this correlation.

Appendix A
Data Appendix
Main Sources of the Data and Their Abbreviations

Federal Reserve Bulletin (FRB)
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
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Federal Reserve Statistical Release (FRSR). Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, weekly.
Individual Series

Ml: Money Stock Measures and Liquid Assets, FRSR H.6 (FRB table 1.21),
average of daily figures of week ending Monday.

Monetary base: Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, FRSR H.3.

Nonborrowed reserves: Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and
the Monetary Base, FRSR H.3.
Federal funds rate: FRB
German call money rate: BIS
Japanese call money rate: BIS

German mark/dollar exchange rate: Foreign Exchange Rates, FRSR G.5.
Japanese yen/dollar exchange rate: Foreign Exchange Rates, FRSR G.5.

Appendix B

TABLE Bi Lag Length Tests for VARs of U.S. Monetary Variables
and Intervention

Frequency

AMI

Daily

AMB

...

Weekly

1

ANBR

...

...

...

...

AFF
9

(.022)
2

(<.001)
(.006)
Biweekly
1
2
1
1
(<.001) (.017) (<.001) (<.001)
NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at
than or equal to this number is equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
levels are in parentheses and are corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity with Newey and West
(1987). The maximum lag for the daily data is 10, while for the weekly and biweekly data it is three.
These systems correspond to the systems in tables 1 and 3. VAR = vector autoregression, MB =
monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed funds rate.

TABLE B2 Lag Length Tests for VARs of Interest Differentials and Intervention

Frequency

FF

-

Rlpn

FF

-

RGer

Daily
9
9
(<.001)
(.004)
Weekly
2
3
(.031)
(.007)
NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at which the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags greater
than or equal to this number is equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
levels are in parentheses and are corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity with Newey and West
(1987). The maximum lag for the daily data is 10, while for the weekly and biweeky data it is three.
These systems correspond to the systems in tables 2 and 4. VAR = vector autoregression, FF =

Fed funds rate. Rlpn is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:42:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

which

Foreign

Exchange

213

TABLE B3 Lag-Length Tests for VAR Systems

A. Bivariate (log X,, log Y.)
Xt

Yt

Ml

NBR

MB

FF

DM
9
5
2
4
(.0405) (.0395) (5.34E-09) (.0008)
Yen
9
10
2
4
(.0032) (.0393) (2.60E-06) (.0002)

B. Trivariate (log X,, log R *, log Y.
Xt

Yt,

Rt*

Ml

NBR

MB

FF

DM,
Rer
8
8
8
4
(.0315) (.0389) (.0338) (.0361)

Yen,

R

JPn

(.0365)

10

(.0472)

10

10

(.0118)

7

(.0133)

NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at which the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags greater
than or equal to this number are equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
levels are in parentheses. These systems correspond to the impulse response functions in figs. 2-5.
VAR = vector autoregression, MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed

funds rate. RIP' is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.
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